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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON,
Case No,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
Court of Appeals
No. 910418CA

vs.
JOHN WENKEL and ROBERT GRAHAM,
Defendant/Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

THE PETITION SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED AND THE CASE SHOULD NOT BE
REVIEWED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
1.

Petitioner

has

not

referred

the Court

to any

"special and important" reasons for the issuance of writ of
certiorari as required by Rules 46 and 49 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
2.

The history and general statutory scheme of the Utah

Dramshop Act indicate that the legislature did not intend to
extend Dramshop liability to social hosts and therefore the
trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly determined that
liability under Utah's Dramshop Act does not apply to social
hosts.
3.

The trial court and Court of Appeals correctly

determined that the petitioner could not amend her complaint.

1

OPINION BELOW
The decision

of the Court of Appeals

sought to be

reviewed by writ of certiorari is Sneddon v. Wenkel, filed
November 25, 1991 (attached in Appendix under Tab No. 1).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (a copy is
attached in the Appendix under Tab No. 2). Section 32A-14-1,
Utah Code Ann. (a copy of the statute is attached in the
Appendix under Tab No. 3). The subject statute was renumbered
by legislative enactment in 19 90 and is found in current
volumes of the Utah Code under § 32A-14-101.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Background and Overview
This case involves a claim for personal injury sustained
by the petitioner as a result of an automobile accident with
the defendant John Wenkel.

Petitioner also filed a claim

against the defendant Robert Graham, alleging that he was
liable under Utah's Dramshop Act for having supplied beer to
Mr. Wenkel while Mr. Wenkel was in Mr. Graham's home prior to
the accident.
Course of Proceedings
1.

On

June

22, 1987, Sneddon

complaint with the Second

filed

her

original

District Court, Weber County,

against defendant John Wenkel.

2

2.

On

complaint,

March
adding

30,

19 88,

defendant

Sneddon
Graham,

filed

an

alleging

amended
Dramshop

liability against him.
3.

Graham filed his motion for summary judgment on July

19, 1989.
4.

The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor issued a memorandum

decision granting Graham1s motion for summary judgment on
September

26, 1989.

Thereafter,

an

order

was

entered

dismissing the complaint of Sneddon against Graham on November
3, 1989.
5.

(See Appendix Tab No. 4.)
On or about November 8, 1989, Sneddon and defendant

Wenkel entered into a settlement agreement and a release was
executed releasing the claims of Sneddon against the defendant
Wenkel.

Subsequently,

on February

14, 1990, an order

dismissing the claims of Sneddon against Wenkel was filed.
6.

In late November, 1989, Sneddon filed a motion to

amend her complaint to add a common law negligence claim
against defendant Graham and also filed a notice of appeal of
the summary judgment in favor of Graham.

Since an order had

not yet entered dismissing the claims of Sneddon against
defendant Wenkel, the dismissal of defendant Graham by summary
judgment was not a final and appealable order and therefore
Sneddon's initial appeal was dismissed.
7.

Sneddon filed a second motion to amend her complaint

on January 23, 1990. The trial court denied Sneddon's second

3

motion to amend her complaint, which order was entered April
13, 1990 •
8•

(See Appendix Tab No. 5.)
Having settled with the defendant Wenkel and an

order dismissing the claims of Sneddon against defendant
Wenkel having been entered in February, 1990, Sneddon then
filed a notice of appeal following the denial of her motion to
amend in April, 1990.
9.

This matter was heard before the Utah Court of

Appeals and an opinion was filed November 25, 1991. (Opinion,
Appendix Tab No. 1.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On April 25, 1986, Wenkel and Graham got off of work

at approximately 11:00 p.m. and each traveled in their own
vehicle to a nearby 7-Eleven store where they each separately
purchased some beer.

(Graham Depo. at 14; Wenkel March, 1988

Depo. at 13.)
2.

From the 7-Eleven store, Wenkel and Graham then

traveled in their own separate vehicles to Graham's residence.
3.

Upon arrival at Graham's

residence, Wenkel and

Graham put their beer into Graham refrigerator.

(Wenkel

March, 19 88 Depo. at 13; Graham Depo. at 17.)
4.

Wenkel and Graham then spent the evening talking and

drinking the beer they had purchased.

Although Graham would

dispute that Wenkel ever consumed any of Graham's beer or that
Graham ever knew Wenkel had consumed any of Graham's beer, for

4

purposes of the summary judgment motion, and on appeal, Graham
will assume that Wenkel consumed the beer that Wenkel had
purchased plus two cans of Graham's beer since that was the
recollection of Wenkel.

(Wenkel June 27, 1989 Depo. at 13;

also see Court of Appeals Opinion Re:

Background Facts, p.

1.)
ARGUMENT
POINT L
PETITIONER HAS NOT REFERRED THE COURT TO
ANY "SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT" REASONS FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI AS
REQUIRED BY RULES 46 AND 49 OF THE UTAH
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
The character of reasons set forth by petitioner as
questions and the basis for request for review by writ of
certiorari do not give this Court any "special and important"
reasons why the decision of the Court of Appeals should be
reviewed.
The questions

and

reasons

for review listed

by the

petitioner ask for a determination whether the trial court
erred

in

granting

summary

judgment

and

in denying

the

petitioner's request to amend her complaint for a second time.
The petition

fails to articulate

"special and

important

reasons" why the Supreme Court should review the decision of
the Court of Appeals. Rather, the petition is a repeat of the
arguments

presented

to the Court of Appeals which were

5

rejected.

Therefore, this Court should not grant the writ

petitioned for.
POINT II,
THE HISTORY AND GENERAL STATUTORY SCHEME
OF THE UTAH DRAMSHOP ACT INDICATE THAT
THE LEGISLATURE DID NOT INTEND TO EXTEND
DRAMSHOP LIABILITY TO SOCIAL HOSTS AND
THEREFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT
OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
LIABILITY FOR SOCIAL HOSTS DOES NOT ARISE
FROM SAID ACT.
The Court of Appeals correctly analyzed the history of
Dramshop statutes in Utah in coming to its determination that
the legislature did not intend the Dramshop statute to apply
to social hosts.

(See footnote no. 1, Court of Appeals

Decision, Appendix Tab No. 1.)
The original Dramshop statute in 1981 premised liability
based upon supply of liquor contrary to the requirements of
other referenced sections of the code, including § 32-7-14 and
§ 32-7-24.

A comparison of the present act (32A-14-1) with

the 19 81 act establishes the clear intent that the present
statute applies only to commercial context settings.
In the 1981 act, liability was imposed upon any person
supplying alcohol to a person already under the influence of
liquor (§ 32-7-14) or any person who permits drunkenness to
take place in any house or on any premises who suffers any
person under the influence of alcohol to consume liquor in any
house or on any premises or who gives liquor to any person
under the influence of liquor (§ 32-7-24) (emphasis added).
6

The legislature overhauled the previous Liquor Control
Act with the "Alcoholic Beverages Control Act" which repealed
the Dramshop Act of 19 81.

The new Dramshop Act in effect at

the time pertinent to this case was found at § 32A-14-1 (now
renumbered as § 32A-14-101). Prior references in the repealed
statute to "permit drunkenness to take place in any house
. . ." or to permit a person under the influence of liquor "to
consume any liquor in any house . . . " were repealed and not
found in the new Dramshop statute.

The new Dramshop statute

at § 32A-14-1 effective in 1986 provides that:
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells,
or otherwise provides liquor, or at a
location allowing consumption on the
premises, any alcoholic beverages, to
a person:
(a) Who is under the age of twentyone (21) years, or
(b) Who is apparently under the
influence
of
intoxicating
alcoholic beverages or products
or drugs, or
(c) Whom the person furnishing the
alcoholic
beverage
knew
or
should have known from the
circumstances was under the
influence
of
intoxicating
alcoholic beverages or products
or drugs, or
(d) Who is a known indicted person,
and by those actions causes the
intoxication of that person, is
liable for injuries in person,
property, or means of support to any
third person, or to the spouse,
child, or parent of that third person
7

resulting from the intoxication. An
employer is liable for the actions of
its employees in violation of this
chapter.
(2) A person who suffers an injury under
Subsection (1) has a cause of action
against the person who provided the
liquor or alcoholic beverage in
violation
of
Subsection
(1).
(Section 32A-14-1, Utah Code Ann.
1986, now renumbered as § 32A-14101. )
Notably absent from the statute in force at the time of
this incident are references to "house".

As noted by the

Court of Appeals, the legislature has not used the word
"house" or "private residence", rather the word "premises" is
used in the statute.
In Traylor Bros. Inc./Frunin-Colnon v. Overton, 736 P.2d
1048

(Utah App.

1987),

the

Court

of Appeals

discussed

statutory interpretation and stated that:
. . . the intent of the legislature is
revealed in the use of the term in the
context and structure in which it is
placed. Consequently, omission should be
noted and given effect. (Quoting from p.
1052. )
The Dramshop Act premises liability upon "any person who
directly gives, sells or otherwise provides . . . " alcoholic
beverage at a location allowing consumption on the premises.
As noted by the Court of Appeals, person is defined in the
Alcoholic Beverages Control Act.

(See Court of Appeals

Decision, p. 4, Appendix Tab No. 1, quoting from § 32A-15(27).)
8

The definition of person in the Alcoholic Beverages
Control Act evidences a business or commercial context.
definition

provides

that

person

is

"any

The

individual,

partnership, firm, corporation, association, business trust,
or other form of business enterprise including a receiver or
trustee, . . . "
The definition of person is clear that it is meant to
address a "form of business enterprise".

(See also Court of

Appeals Decision, pp. 4, 5, Appendix Tab No. 1.)
In

the

Alcoholic

Beverages

Control

"premises" is also a defined term.

Act,

the

word

The definition does not

include the word "house" or "private residence".

(See Court

of Appeals Decision, pp. 4, 5, Appendix Tab No. 1.)
The Court of Appeals Decision that the Dramshop Act does
not apply to individuals in a noncommercial social setting is
also confirmed by the legislative history of the Dramshop Act
that is the subject of this case.

From the legislative

history, Senate Bill 182, day 38, February 19, 1986, Disk No.
83, the legislative history provides in part that:
This bill extends the Dramshop
Act, not only to people who are selling
liquor, but it also extends it to people
who are selling beer if that beer is
consumed on the p r e m i s e s . . . .
Senator Cornaby:
Mr. President, the
original theory and the prevalent theory
under the Dramshop Act in all of the
states that I am aware of as well as in
Utah to date has been that a Dramshop
owner—a bar owner who has a person
9

sitting in his establishment—drinking
and the bartender is in a position to
observe the demeanor of that person while
that
person
is
drinking,
has
an
opportunity to determine when that person
has had enough and can say to that person
Ifm not going to sell anymore and if that
person is sold something more and goes
out and
causes an accident, then
(inaudible) Dramshop owner or bartender
is liable. . . .
The current law only goes to
liquor, the current law does not go to
beer.
This bill — one of the things
that this bill does and one of the
tradeoffs that was made in working this
bill out was to include the sale of beer
-- not only liquor, but beer -- in to
this law, so the current law does not
have beer in it. This includes beer.
But only if the beer is sold to be
consumed on the premises, so that you're
selling it at a bar — you're selling it
at a function where the person handing
the drink to someone will be able to
observe that person rather than the 18year-old checker or the 19-year-old
checker that's at a grocery store that's
handing the beer to them. . . .
POINT III.
THE MAJORITY OP OTHER JURISDICTIONS THAT
HAVE CONSTRUED DRAMSHOP STATUTES HAVE
HELD THEM TO APPLY TO COMMERCIAL CONTEXTS
AND NOT TO SOCIAL SETTINGS.
Other

jurisdictions

when

confronted

with

Dramshop

statutes similar to Utah's have determined that they are not
intended to apply to social settings.
American Veterans, 466 N.E.2d 1239

In Fabian v. Polish

(111. App. 1984), the

Illinois Appellate Court reasoned that:
The Dramshop Act was intended to regulate
the business of selling, distributing,
10

manufacturing and wholesaling alcoholic
liquors for profit, . . •
To impose liability on the association in
the
instant
case
would
make
no
distinction between those engaged in the
liquor business for profit and those who
hold social gatherings where liquor is
dispensed. (Quoting from p. 1241.)
Heldt

v.

Drei,

455

N.E.2d

842

(111.

App.

1983),

determined that the Dramshop Act applied only to commercial
contexts even though the act used the word "giving".
In Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. App. 1985), the
Missouri Court of Appeals stated that:
The obvious intent of the
legislature is the control of liquor
licensees in the dispensing and sale of
alcohol. In the context of the entire
act and its stated purposes, the apparent
intention is to regulate the commercial
sale of liquor, not its use in a social
setting. (Quoting from p. 22 3.)
In a later case, the Missouri Supreme Court in Childress
v. Sans, 736 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1987), held that the Dramshop Act
did not apply to a social setting where the guests had made a
contribution to defray the expenses of the alcohol. The court
noted that:
No commercial motive is evident. We find
that Sands and Hulsey were social hosts
and that under the Harriman rule adopted
in Audres, the trial court properly
sustained
the
motion
for
summary
judgment. (Quoting from p. 50.)
In D'Amico v. Christie, 518 N.E.2d 896 (N.Y. 1987), the
New York court construing its Dramshop statute that imposed

11

liability upon anyone "unlawfully selling to or unlawfully
assisting in procuring liquor for" refused to extend liability
to social hosts and stated that:
While not literally restricted to actual
"Dramshops" or commercial taverns, the
Dramshop Act has consistently been read
by lower courts as applicable only to
sales of liquor for profit — that is,
commercial sales • . . . We find no basis
for
departing
from
the
consistent
interpretation of lower courts that the
Dramshop Act requires a commercial sale
of alcohol.
(Quoting from pp. 89 8 and
899, citations omitted.)
See also, Smoyer v. Birmingham Area Chamber of Commerce, 517
So.2d 585 (Ala. 1987).
A decision which points to compelling policy reasons for
not extending Dramshop liability to social hosts is Burkhart
v. Harrod, 755 P.2d 759 (Wash. 1988).

In the Burkhart case,

the Washington Supreme Court noted some of the many practical
problems which attend the imposition of Dramshop liability on
social hosts:
Opponent
stressed
the
potential
substantial financial liability that
social hosts would face, as well as the
heavy burden that would be placed on
social hosts to regulate guests1 alcohol
consumption. This duty to regulate the
drinking of others would raise a series
of problematic questions for social
hosts.
How
is
a
social
host,
inexperienced at judging the extent to
which others have been intoxicated, to
decide the course of his own actions?
Must the host determine if a quest has
been drinking before arriving at the
party? Can the host determine if a guest
is drinking on an empty stomach? What if
12

a guest is taking prescribed medication
or using illegal drugs? Must the host
count the number of drinks that each
guest consumes? Is it necessary to gage
a guest's weight and height in order to
determine allowable amounts of alcohol?
May guests be allowed to mix their own
drinks, or should the host tend the bar
himself to monitor consumption? Must the
host refrain from drinking in order to
better supervise the guests? Must the
host determine which of its guests will
be driving home? Before guests depart,
should the host conduct sobriety tests,
asking them to recite the alphabet or
walk a straight line? If an intoxicated
guest insists on driving home, how far
can the host go in preventing him from
doing so? Must he offer to pay for a
taxi or put the guest up for the night?
As one court has noted, the implications
of social host liability are almost
limitless. (Quoting from p. 760.)
On page 11 of petitioner's brief, the case of Kelly v.
Gwinnell, 476 A.2d

1219

(N.J.

1984),

is cited

for the

proposition that liability should apply to social hosts under
Dramshop Acts.

Petitioner has mislead the court in citing

that case for the proposition stated since the state of New
Jersey did not have a Dramshop statute at the time of the
Kelly decision and the case only deals with the proposition of
a

decision

by

that

state's

court

that

under

circumstances, a duty can arise to a social host.

certain
Later in

this brief, defendant Graham will address the fact that the
majority of jurisdictions faced with a request to extend
common law liability to social hosts have declined to do so in

13

addition to those states that have declined to extend Dramshop
liability to social hosts,
POINT IV.
THE
TRIAL
COURT
EXERCISED
SOUND
DISCRETION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT.
A.

The Petitioner's Motion to Amend Was Properly Denied
Given the Age of the Complaint, the Development of
Discovery, the Dismissal of Sneddon's Complaint Against
Graham, and the Consequential Prejudice Graham Would Have
Suffered if an Amendment Had Been Permitted.
Some two months after the trial court granted Graham's

motion for summary judgment, the petitioner moved to amend her
complaint to allege a common law Dramshop theory against
Graham.

By the time petitioner had moved to amend her

complaint, her case was well over two years old.

The trial

court had already permitted amendment of the complaint twice
before the motion which was denied.

Graham had moved for and

obtained summary judgment.
As recognized by the Court of Appeals in its decision on
page 5 (see Decision, Appendix Tab No. 1):
We will not disturb a trial court's
ruling on a motion to amend a complaint
absent a clear abuse of discretion.
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248
(Utah 1983); Kelly v. Utah Power and
Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1190 (Utah App.
1987) .
Although the Court of Appeals noted that there was some
ambiguity in the trial court's order concerning the reasons
why the motion to amend was denied, the Court of Appeals noted

14

that the decision was supportable for two reasons.

First of

all, the decision is supportable based upon timeliness.

On

pages 6 and 7 of the Court of Appeals decision (see Appendix
Tab No. 1) after citing to authorities speaking to denials of
motions to amend made late in the case, the Court of Appeals
stated on page 7 of its opinion that:
In the present case, Sneddon sought to
amend her complaint more than two years
after the filing of her original
complaint. The trial court had already
granted her leave to add Graham as a
party after the action was filed. When
Sneddon again moved the court for
permission to amend, the case was set for
trial later that month. We believe that
it would almost certainly be prejudicial
to Graham to allow Sneddon to amend her
complaint to add an entirely new cause of
action at such a late date, in the course
of the proceedings.
Accordingly, we
cannot say that the trial court abused
its discretion in denying Sneddon's
motion.
The second basis to support the denial of the motion to
amend is grounded in the trial court and Court of Appeals
determination that no common law cause of action arises in the
context of a social host/guest situation.
In footnote no. 2 of its opinion, the Court of Appeals on
page 9 of the opinion (Appendix Tab No. 1) stated that:
2.

Sneddon also urges us to recognize a
common law action of negligence in
the context of a social host, an
issue which had not been addressed in
the courts of this state to date.
However, we note the Utah Supreme
Court has adopted the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 315, which states
15

that no duty can be found to protect
another from harm unless and until a
special relationship exists between
the parties. See Beach v. University
of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986)
(Supreme Court
affirmed
summary
judgment in favor of defendant where
plaintiff failed to show affirmative
duty existed on part of defendant to
protect plaintiff from harm.)
No
such
relationship
has
been
established
between
Sneddon and
Graham.
Although it is not necessary to determine whether there
is in fact a common law Dramshop cause of action in Utah to
analyze the issue of whether or not the trial judge abused his
discretion in denying Sneddon's motion for leave to amend, the
following citation to cases from other jurisdictions supports
the conclusion of the trial court and Court of Appeals as an
alternative basis for sustaining the decision denying leave to
amend.
Research of the cases from other jurisdictions that have
addressed this issue show that the clear majority have refused
to extend a common law cause of action in favor of a person,
injured by an intoxicated person against a social host who
furnished alcohol to the intoxicated person:
Keckonen

v.

Connecticut —

Robles,

705

P.2d

945

(Ariz.

Arizona
App.

—

1985);

Slicer v. Quigley, 429 A.2d 855 (Conn. 1980);

Illinois -- Heldt v. Drei, 455 N.E.2d 842 (111. App. 1983);
Mississippi —

Boutwell v. Sullivan, 469 S.2d

526 (Miss.

1985); Missouri — Harriman v. Smith, 697 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. App.
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1985), Childress v. Sans, 736 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1987); Montana —
Runge v. Watts, 589 P.2d 145 (Mont. 1979); Ohio —

Suttlemyer

v. Wilmington Veterans Post No. 49, 464 N.E.2d 521 (Ohio
1984), Pennsylvania —

Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507 (Pa.

1983); South Carolina —

Garren v. Cummings & McCrady, Inc.,

345 S.E.2d 508 (S.C. App. 1986); Tennessee — Cecil v. Hardin,
575 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn. 1978); Texas —

Walker v. Childrens1

Services, Inc., 751 S.W.2D 771 (Texas App. — Amarillo 1988);
Washington —

Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 458 P.2d

897 (Wash. 1969).
The above-cited cases employ three basic rationales in
refusing to recognize such a cause of action:

(1) As a matter

of law, it is not the furnishing or providing of the alcoholic
beverages, but the consumption, which is the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries; (2) a social host owes no duty to
the injured third party because no special relationship exists
between the social host and the intoxicated guest or the
social host and the injured third party, which is necessary
for a duty to arise; and (3) public policy considerations show
that the differences between commercial and social providers
of alcohol are crucial and numerous.

An imposition of

liability upon the social host should be undertaken by the
legislature, which has the resources necessary
evaluate the situation and establish proper law.
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DATED this

day of

f^^r~<A^*^

r

1992.

M. Belnap
Attorneys for
Defendant/Respondent Graham

201609nh

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing were mailed, first class postage prepaid, this
J^F^

day of February, 1992.
Erik M. Ward
Christopher L. Shaw
Attorneys for Petitioner Sneddon
6 35 25th Street
Ogden, UT 84401
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APPENDIX
Tab No.
Court of Appeals Decision filed November 25, 1991
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15

. . . . . . .

Utah Code Annotated, Section 32A-14-1
Order Dismissing the Complaint of Sneddon Against
Graham, November 3, 1989
Order Denying Sneddon's Second Motion to Amend
Complaint, April 13, 1990
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Robyn Lynn Sneddon,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 910418-CA

v.
Robert Graham and John
Wenkel,

Defendants and Appellee.

)

F I L E D

)
)

(November 25, 1991)

Second District, Weber County
The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor
Attorneys:

Erik M. Ward and Robert K. Hunt, Ogden, for Appellant
Paul M. Belnap and Lynn S. Davies, Salt Lake City,
for Appellee

Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Orme.
JACKSON, Judge:
Appellant Robyn Lynn Sneddon appeals from the trial court's
grant of appellee Robert Graham's motion for summary judgment,
and the trial court's denial of her motion to amend her
complaint. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
This case arose out of an automobile accident which occurred
on April 25, 1986, where Sneddon was injured when the automobile
operated by John Wenkel collided with Sneddon's vehicle. Graham
and Wenkel had each purchased approximately a six-pack of beer on
their way home from work on April 24, the night before the
accident. At Graham's home, Graham and Wenkel consumed the beer
that had been purchased. Although the facts are in dispute as to
who drank which beer, for purposes of this appeal, the parties
agree that Wenkel consumed the six cans of beer he had purchased,
and consumed two of the beers that Graham had purchased. The
following morning Wenkel left Graham's home and collided with
Sneddon's vehicle, which was parked in her driveway.

Sneddon filed her original complaint naming only Wenkel as
defendant in June of 1987. In March of 1988, Sneddon added
Graham as a codefendant, claiming that under Utah's Dramshop law,
he knew or should have known that Wenkel was under the influence
of alcohol and was negligent in letting him drive in that
condition. Graham filed a motion for summary judgment which the
trial court granted on November 3, 1989. The order dismissed all
claims against Graham, with prejudice. In late November, Sneddon
filed a motion to amend her complaint to add a common law
negligence claim against Graham, and also filed a notice of
appeal of the summary judgment in favor of Graham.
Graham moved the supreme court to dismiss Sneddon's appeal
because there were still claims pending against Wenkel, and
therefore, there was no final order from which Sneddon could
appeal. In December, the parties stipulated to a remand of the
appeal to the trial court to obtain a final order, and the
supreme court granted the motion to dismiss the premature appeal
in January 1990.
The trial court denied Sneddon's motion to amend her
complaint, stating that it lacked jurisdiction. No final order
denying this motion was signed. In January of 1990, Sneddon
again moved the trial court to allow her to amend her complaint
to add a common law negligence action against Graham. Prior to
the court ruling on this motion, Sneddon and Wenkel reached a
settlement agreement and all claims against Wenkel were dismissed
on February 14, 1990. The trial court then denied Sneddon's
second motion to amend her complaint and a final order denying
the motion was entered in April 1990.
Sneddon appeals the trial court's summary judgment against
her, claiming that, contrary to the trial court's legal
conclusion, Utah's Dramshop law, Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-1
(1986), applies in a social setting. Sneddon also appeals the
trial court's denial of her motion to amend her complaint,
claiming that such an amendment would not have prejudiced Graham,
and that a common law action of negligence under these
circumstances should be recognized in this state.
DRAMSHOP LIABILITY
In reviewing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, we
must construe facts in a light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion. Silcox v. Skaaas Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d
623, 624 (Utah App. 1991). "Summary judgment can [only] be
granted when no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. at
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623 (citations omitted). "Because the trial court's ruling on
the meaning of a statute presents a question of law, we review it
for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's
conclusion." Tanner v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 799 P.2d 231, 233 (Utah
App. 1991) (citation omitted).
In the present case, the trial court granted Graham's motion
for summary judgment, stating that Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-1
(1986) was not intended to apply in a social, as opposed to
commercial, setting. Chapter 14 of the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act (hereinafter the Dramshop Act) establishes liability
for injuries resulting from the intoxication of an individual.
It states in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who directly gives,
sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or
at a location allowing consumption on the
premises, any alcoholic beverage, to a
person:
(a) who is under the age of
21 years or
(b) who is apparently under
the influence of intoxicating
alcoholic beverages or products or
drugs or
(c) whom the person
furnishing the alcoholic beverage
knew or should have known from the
circumstances was under the
influence of intoxicating alcoholic
beverages or products or drugs or
(d) who is a known
interdicted person, . . .
is liable for injuries in person,
property, or means of support to any
third person, or to the spouse, child, or
parent of that third person, resulting
from the intoxication.
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-1 (1986). Sneddon claims that the broad
language of the Dramshop Act, as well as public policy, supports
extending liability to social hosts. Graham argues that the
language of the statute and its legislative history indicate an
intent to extend liability only to the commercial setting.
"Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this
Court will not look beyond to divine legislative intent."
Allisen v. American Legion Post No. 134, 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah
1988). However, when the language is ambiguous, we may attempt
to discern the intention of the legislature. P.I.E. Employees
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Fed, Credit Union v. Bass, 759 P.2d 1144, 1151 (Utah 1988), "A
statute is ambiguous if it can be understood by reasonably wellinformed persons to have different meanings." Tanner, 799 P.2d
at 23 3, While Sneddon urges us to find to the contrary, because
several of the terms utilized in the Dramshop Act are defined
elsewhere in the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, Utah Code Ann,
§§ 32A-1 to -17 (1986), we hold that section 32A-14-1(1) is not
ambiguous.
For example, "person" is defined as "any individual,
partnership, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or
other form of business enterprise, including a receiver or
trustee, and the plural as well as the singular number, unless
the intent to give a more limited meaning is disclosed by the
context." Section 32A-l-5(27). "Liquor" is defined to
specifically exclude any beverage defined as a beer "that has an
alcohol content of less than 4% alcohol by volume," section 32A1-5(17), while "alcoholic beverages" "means A beer' and liquor'
as the terms are defined in this section." Section 32A-1-5(1).
"Premises" is defined as "any building, enclosure, room, or
equipment used in connection with the sale, storage, service,
manufacture, distribution, or consumption of alcoholic products,
unless otherwise defined in this title or in the rules adopted by
the commission." Section 32A-l-5(29).
When the principal provisions of the Dramshop Act are read
in context with the definitions provided by that Act, it is not
ambiguous. The statute 7 s plain language explicitly limits
liability to persons who provide alcoholic beverages "at a
location allowing consumption on the premises[.]" Conspicuously
absent from the definition of "premises" is the word "house" or
"private residence." See section 32A-1-5(29).*
1. Sneddon urges us to overlook this omission, arguing that the
legislative history of the Dramshop Act indicates it was intended
to regulate not only the sale and distribution of alcohol, but
the possession and use of alcohol in a social setting as well.
We disagree.
The legislative history of the Dramshop Act underscores this
interpretation. The original Dramshop Act statute, added to the
Intoxicating Liquor Code in 1981, imposed liability upon any
person who "gives, sells, or otherwise provides intoxicating
liquor to another, contrary to subsection 16-6-13,.1(8)(d),
subsection 32-1-36.5(1)(1), section 32-7-14 or subsection 32-724(b) or (c) . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 32-11-1 (Supp. 1981)
(repealed 1985). The sections referred to in the statute
provided for the imposition of liability upon persons supplying
alcohol to "any person under or apparently under the influence of
(continued...)
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We decline to accept Sneddon's arguments, and affirm the
trial court's legal conclusion that the Dramshop Act does not
apply to individuals in a noncommercial social setting.
AMENDING THE COMPLAINT
We will not disturb a
amend a complaint absent a
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248
Light, 746 P.2d 1189, 1190

trial
clear
(Utah
(Utah

court's ruling on a motion to
abuse of discretion. Girard v.
1983); Kelly v. Utah Power &
App. 1987).

Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows for
amendment of a complaint
once as a matter of course at any time
before a responsive pleading is served
or, if the pleading is one to which no
responsive pleading is permitted and the
action has not been placed upon the trial
calendar, he may so amend it at any time
within 20 days after it is served.
Otherwise a party may amend his pleading
only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave
shall be freely given when justice so
requires.

1. (...continued)
liquor," Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-14 (1966) (repealed 1985), or upon
persons who "permit drunkenness to take place in any house or on
any premises of which he is the owner, tenant or occupant; or (b)
permit or suffer any person apparently under the influence of
liquor to consume any liquor in any house or on any premisesf,1
. . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-24(a)-(b) (1966) (emphasis added)
(repealed 1985).
In 1985, Title 32, Intoxicating Liquors, was repealed and
replaced by Title 32A, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. An
amended version of the Dramshop Act was enacted and codified as
§ 32A-14-1 (1986), and amended versions of §§ 32-7-14 and 32-7-24
were enacted and codified as §§ 32A-12-9 and 32A-12-21 (1986).
The amended Dramshop Act makes no reference to other sections of
the Alcoholic Beverage Code. Instead, the prohibited acts are
included in the Dramshop Act statute itself. The words "house,"
or "private residence" do not appear in any of the amended
statutes. Only the word "premises" appears in §§ 32A-12-21 and
32A-14-1.
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In denying Sneddon's motion to amend, the trial court
stated:
The court having previously granted
Defendant's motion for summary judgment
and having entered summary judgment dated
November 3, 1989, dismissing the
complaint of the plaintiff with
prejudice, the plaintiff filed a Motion
to Amend Complaint to "add a cause of
action against the defendant, Robert
Graham, based upon a theory of common law
negligence in supplying intoxicating
liquor to the co-defendant, John Wenkel."

Having reviewed the motion, and the
memorandum in opposition to the same, and
having heard the argument of counsel
together with the procedural posture of
the case, with the court having
previously dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint, and the court having indicated
at the time* of hearing that if it is
deemed appropriate at the procedural
juncture of this case to move to amend
the complaint, the court is of the
opinion that there is not a common law
cause of action .running in favor of a
person injured against a person who
supplied alcohol, nor does the court
believe that the provisions of Utah's
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act affords a
plaintiff a cause of action under the
facts and circumstances of this case
It is unclear whether the trial court denied Sneddon's
motion because it felt it was inappropriate given the procedural
posture of the case, because it had no jurisdiction to amend a
complaint that had been dismissed by summary judgment, or, as
Sneddon contends, because the court was of the opinion that a
common law negligence cause of action could not be-raised given
the facts of the case.
A.

Timeliness of Sneddon's Motion to Amend

Graham argues that the trial court properly denied Sneddon's
motion to amend her complaint because of the age of the initial
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complaint, the development of discovery, the dismissal of
Sneddon's claim against Graham, and the potential prejudice to
Graham.
"In considering a motion to amend, the trial judge must
decide 'whether the opposing side would be put to unfavorable
prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for which he had not
time to prepare.'" Kelly, 746 P.2d at 1190 (quoting Bekins Bar V
Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983)). In Kelly, the
plaintiff sought to add two defendants more than three years
afte>- the case was initiated. This court concluded the trial
court acted within its discretion in denying the plaintiff's
motion to amend her complaint, reasoning that it was unfair to
expect the defendants to be prepared to defend an additional
action at such a late date. See also Westlev v. Farmer's Ins.
Exch., 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983) (per curiam) (since amendment
to complaint would have delayed trial and substance of new
allegation was known to plaintiff a full year earlier, no abuse
in denying motion).
In the present case, Sneddon sought to amend her complaint
more than two years after the filing of her original complaint.
The trial court had already granted her leave to add Graham as a
party after the action was filed. When Sneddon again moved the
court for permission to amend, the case was set for trial later
that month. We believe that it would almost certainly be
prejudicial to Graham to allow Sneddon to amend her complaint to
add an entirely new cause of action at such a late date, in the
course of the proceedings. Accordingly, we cannot say that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying Sneddon's motion.
B.

The Order of Dismissal as to Graham as a Final Adjudication

As to whether the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain
Sneddon's motion to amend, Sneddon argues that the summary
judgment in favor of Graham did not become a final judgment until
the court entered its order denying Sneddon's motion to amend her
complaint, on April 16, 1990. Sneddon incorrectly argues that if
the dismissal of her claims against Graham was not a final order
so as to permit appeal, then it was not a final order so as to
prevent the trial court from granting leave to amend her
complaint.
An order that does not wholly dispose of a claim or a party
is not final, and therefore not appealable. Pate v. Marathon
Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1984); Backstrom Family Ltd.
Partnership v. Hallr 751 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Utah App. 1988). A
trial court's granting of a motion for summary judgment which
does not dispose of all claims of all parties, and which has not
been certified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,, is not a final judgment for
purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Steck v. Aaqaire, 789 P.2d
708 (Utah 1990) (per curiam). Rule 54(b) states:
When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or
third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as
to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court that there is
no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of
judgment. In the absence of such
determination and direction, any order or
other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates fewer than
all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties
shall not terminate the action as to any
of the claims or parties, and the order
or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of
judgment adjudicating all the claims and
the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.
As Sneddon asserts, the dismissal of her claim as to Graham
did not wholly dispose of her case. There were still claims
pending against Wenkel. Therefore, while the supreme court may
not have had jurisdiction to entertain an appeal where the trial
court had not entered a final judgment as to both Graham and
Wenkel, see, e.g., A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817
P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991); Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1991), the trial court
continued to have jurisdiction until all claims had been settled.
The trial court had jurisdiction to rule on Sneddon's motion to
amend her complaint, and it exercised that jurisdiction in
denying the motion.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, both the trial court's grant of
Graham's motion for summary judgment, and the denial of Sneddon's
motion to amend her cgKi©lain£, are affirmed. 2

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

WE CONCUR:
iS_
</
Judith M. Billings, Judge

Gregory**. Orme, Judge

2- Sneddon also urges us to recognize a common law action of
negligence in the context of a social host, an issue which had
not been addressed in the courts of this state to date. However,
we note the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 315, which states that no duty can be found
to protect another from harm unless and until a special
relationship exists between the parties. See Beach v. University
of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) (supreme court affirmed summary
judgment in favor of defendant where plaintiff failed to show
affirmative duty existed on part of defendant to protect
plaintiff from h a r m ) . No such relationship has been established
between Sneddon and Graham.

910418-CA

9

Tab 2

Rule 15, Amended and supplemental pleadings,
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is
one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been
placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely
given when justice so requires. A*party shall plead in response to an amended
pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or
within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may
be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by
the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.

Tab 3

32A-14-1. Liability for injuries resulting from illegal sale
or other distribution of alcoholic beverages —
Injured person's cause of action against intoxicated person or persons who provided alcoholic beverage — Survival of action.
(1) Any person who directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides liquor, or
at a location allowing consumption on the premises, any alcoholic beverage,
to a person:
(a) who is under the age of 21 years or
(b) who is apparently under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic
beverages or products or drugs or
(c) whom the person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or
should have known from the circumstances was under the influence of
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs or
(d) who is a known interdicted person,
and by those actions causes the intoxication of that person, is liable for
injuries in person, property, or means of support to any third person, or to
the spouse, child, or parent of that third person, resulting from the intoxication. An employer is liable for the actions of its employees in violation of
this chapter.
(2) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) has a cause of
action .against the person who provided the liquor or other alcoholic beverage in violation of Subsection (U.
(3) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the
rights or liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that
person's estate.
(4) The total amount of damages that may be awarded to any person
pursuant to a cause of action under this chapter which arises after the
effective date of this subsection is limited to $100,000 and the aggregate
amount which may be awarded to all persons injured as a result of one
occurrence is limited to $300,000.
(5) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter which
arises after the effective date of this subsection shall be commenced within
two years after the date of the iryury.
(6) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional
recovery against the person causing the injury.
History: C. 1953,32A-14-1, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 175, $ 1; 1986, ch. 177, $ 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amendment, effective March 17, 1986, added the
language in Subsection (1) following "or otherwise provides liquor," Subsections (l)(a)
through (l)(d), the last sentence in Subsection (1), and Subsections (4) through (6); inserted "directly" in Subsection (1) near the

beginning; in Subsection (2), inserted "or
other alcoholic beverage"; and made minor
stylistic changes.
Compiler's Notes. — The phrase "effective date of this subsection," referred to in
Subsections (4) and (5), appears in Laws
1986, ch. 177, § 3, which became effective
March 17.1986.

Tab 4

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON,
t

RULING ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
\

JOHN WENKEL and
ROBERT GRAHAM,

Case No.

870999559

\

Defendant.

The parties agree that for purposes of this motion, the
conduct

complained

of

arose

in

a

social

as

opposed

to a

commercial setting.
The Court is persuaded that the statute in question is
not intended to apply in a social setting and accordingly grants
defendant Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this

Jf)

day of September, 1989.

Paul M. Belnap, #0279
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
— — — • — — • •

'

'

i

ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON,
Plaintiff,

I

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

V.

Civil No. 99559
JOHN WENKEL and ROBERT
GRAHAM,
Defendants.
The above-entitled matter came before the court on the
defendant Robert Graham's Motion for summary Judgment.

The court

having reviewed the memoranda submitted in support of the motion
and in opposition to the motion, and having issued its Memorandum
Decision determining that the statutes in question were not
intended to apply in a social setting as found in this case, it
is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant
Robert Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and that
the plaintiff's complaint against Robert Graham is hereby

dismissed with prejudice, costs to defendant Granam.
DATED this _J

day of Af/wkSUX d kJL*^

, 1989,

BY THE COURT:
it&nton M. Taylor
Mz
District Court Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this^JT^

day of /y-Jj/t-$<>,_

/ ,

1989, a true and correct copy of the foregoing summary Judgment
was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Erik M. Ward
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
P. 0. BOX 1850
635 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84402
Lynn S. Davies
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P. O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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Tab 5

Paul M. Belnap, #0279
Brett G. Pearce, #5220
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant,
Robert Graham
sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ROBYN LYNN SNEDDON,
Plaintiff,

|
)

ORDER

V.

JOHN WENKEL and ROBERT
GRAHAM,
Defendants.

1
1

Civil No. 870999559
Judge Stanton Taylor

The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on the 12th
day of March, 1990, at the hour of 10:45 A.M. before the
Honorable Stanton Taylor, District Court Judge, on Plaintiff's
Motion to Amend Complaint.
The plaintiff was represented by her counsel of record
and defendant Robert Graham was represented by his counsel of
record.
The court having previously granted Defendants Motion
for summary Judgment and having entered its Summary Judgment
dated November 3, 1989, dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff

with prejudice, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend complaint
to "add a cause of action against the defendant, Robert Graham,
based upon a theory of common law negligence in supplying
intoxicating liquor to the co-defendant, John Wenkel."
A proposed amended complaint was not presented with the
motion, but counsel for plaintiff presented argument as to the
basis for the amended complaint.
Having reviewed the motion, and the memorandum in
opposition to the same, and having heard the argument of counsel
together with the procedural posture of the case, with the court

having previously

dismissed

the plaintiffs complaint,

and the

court having indicated at the time of the hearing that if it is
deemed appropriate at the procedural juncture of this case to
move to amend the complaint, the court is of the opinion that
there is not a common law cause of action running in favor of a
person injured against a person who supplied alcohol, nor does
the court believe that the provisions of Utah's Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act afford to the plaintiff a cause of action
under the facts and circumstances of this case and, therefore, it
is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that

2-

the

p l a i n t i f f ' s Motion t o Amend Complaint i s denied,.
DATED t h i s

1990.

/„ 7 day of

D i s t r ^ t /Sour"
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this 3c ™~ day of /JldA^^L^
1990, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed,
postage prepaid, to:
Erik M. ward
GRIDLEY, ECHARD & WARD
635 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Lynn S. Davies
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor
50 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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